Species, Individuals,
and Domestication

Regan (the foremost animal rights theorist, and an
adamantly individualistic one)
...are not, presumably, addressing the same
issue. I may wholeheartedly agree that the
treatment of the Rhode Island Reds used for
egg-laying and meat consumption purposes is
inhwnane, and I may even become a vegetarian.
But this is not the same thing as evincing a
concern for the preservation of the Rhode
Island Red as a breed, in comparison, say, to
the Leghorn...

A commentary on Jane Duran's
"Domesticated and Then Some"
Gary E. Varner
Washington University

This apparent attempt to distance herself from the
individualistic stance of the animal rights movement
suggests that she intends to address question Q2 rather
thanQl'
These two questions presumably are related, since
showing that a wild species like the turkey vulture is
more morally significant than a domesticated breed of
turkey presumably would give us a reason to prefer
killing an individual turkey in deference to a turkey
vulture, if it came to that. However, the two questions
are importantly distinct conceptually, and an argument
which supports a certain answer to one may not simul
taneously support an analogous answer to the other.
Duran argues by comparing domesticated and wild
animals in various ways and concludes that domesticated
animals "compare favorably" with wild animals,
meaning that, based on the comparisons she considers,
domesticated animals are as or more morally significant
than their wild cousins. In what follows, I consider
each of her comparisons, clarifying the relevance of
each comparison to questions Ql and Q2. The upshot
of my discussion is that while Duran's comparisons
support a certain answer to question Ql, they do not
support an analogous answer to question Q2'
Specifically, Duran's comparisons support answer A l
to question Ql:
AI) Individual animals have greater moral
significance in virtue of their being

I: Introduction
In the second paragraph of "Domesticated and Then
Some," Professor Duran characterizes her topic as "the
question of the moral significance, from the standpoint
of animal rights, of whether or not a species is
domesticated." Her question, so stated, is crucially
ambiguous. Is it
Ql) What can be said about the moral
significance of an individual animal in
virtue of its being a member of a
domesticated species or breed ralher than
a wild species or subspecies? 1
Or is it
02) What moral significance do domesticated
species or breeds have in virtue of their
being domesticated rather than wild?
Duran's reference to "the standpoint of animal rights"
in her topic sentence suggests that she is concerned with
the former question, since, as she later admits, the
animal rights literature is singularly individualistic.2
On the other hand, Duran asserts that she and Tom
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rather than individuals. And so this comparison, if
relevant, would suggest that domesticated breeds are
on a par, morally, with wild species.
Notice, however, that Duran never claims that a
breed's or a species' being subject to genetic evolution
is of any moral significance. And without an argument
for that conclusion, it is difficult to see why it should
be (especially if, like Duran, we have explicitly rejected
as morally irrelevant the fact that domesticated breeds
are ill-equipped for survival without human help).4 If
the comparison is not of any significance, however, then
it provides no reason for thinking that domesticated
breeds are on a par with wild species. So at this point
in her paper, Duran has given us no reason for thinking
that domesticated breeds are even on a par, morally,
with wild species, and she has given us only one reason
for thinking that domesticated individuals are more
morally significant than wild individuals.
Fourth comparison. After discussing the relevance
of Rachels' moral individualism to our treatment of
exceptional individuals, Duran introduces another
comparison which, she believes, favors domesticated
animals: she claims that many or most of them are
"exceptional" or "gifted" members of their species.
Here again, Duran does not explicitly claim that this
comparison is morally relevant. She writes that
"domesticated animals are not typical of their species,
and if this.. .is relevant to their moral standing...[then]
it probably speaks in their favor..... (emphasis altered).
But let us grant that the comparison is significant.
Clearly, the phrase "typical of their species" cannot be
interpreted as referring to species, and the sense of the
phrase is strained by interpreting it as referring to breeds.
The sense pretty clearly is this: "the individual
domesticated animals that make up a breed are not
typical members of their species." Only individuals can
be atypical representatives of their species. So even
if we suppose that Duran has now given us a second
reason for thinking that domesticated individuals are
more morally significant than wild individuals, she still
has not provided us with any reason for thinking that
domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species.
Fifth comparison. Duran next discusses the
significance of the fact that domesticated breeds have
acquired the special traits they have because human
breeders valued those traits. At first glance this seems
to be a comparison of domesticated and wild
, individuals, since it is at the level of individuals that
genetic "traits" are expressed. Earlier in the paper,

members of a domesticated species or
breed rather than a wild species or
subspecies,
without at the same time supporting answer A2 to
question Q2:
Ai) Domesticated species or breeds have
greater moral significance than wild
species or subspecies.

ll: Duran's Comparisons

First comparison. Duran begins by observing that
"many breeds [of domesticated animals] are ill
equipped for survival without human help."3 This
comparison would favor wild over domesticated
individuals as well as wild over domesticated species
(since, as Duran points out, some individual animals
have been bred to have maladapted musculatures which
endanger both the individJ4a1 and the breed, whereas
others have become "shy breeders," which endangers the
breed, but not necessarily the individual), but Duran later
dismisses this comparison as morally irrelevant. She
writes: 'The fact that a breed is ill-equipped for survival
without human intervention...does not immediately
seem to be a morally relevant difference".
Second comparison. Duran then claims that "insofar
as the characteristics having to do with putative moral
significance are concerned, domesticated breeds are at
least on a par with other animals." And she points out,
in support of her claim, that "Domesticated creatures
are, after all, sentient, just as the majority of non
domesticated creatures [are]..... Later in the paper
Duran considers a related comparison, namely that
"Some breeds... seem simply to be more sensitive" than
their wild counterparts to pain and/or emotional distress.
Note, however, that since only individual animals are
sentient, these comparisons suggest only that wild and
domesticated individJ4als "compare favorably," not that
domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species.
Third comparison. Duran next observes that since
"[domesticated animals'] reversion to type is only a
speeded-up version of the general genetic change taking
place in all living beings," insofar as Ibis is of any moral
significance, it suggests that "domesticated animals
[are] more or less on a par with non-domesticated
animals." Since evolutionary changes do not occur
within a single lifetime-since "reversion to type"
cannot occur in a single generation-the reference of
"they" in this comparison must be species and breeds
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becomes her sixth comparison. She writes: "the
counterargument that naturally occurring untouched
species are members of the original primeval environ
ment and hence deserve special consideration is strong"
(emphasis added). Thus, she suggests that even if her
fIfth comparison were admitted as morally relevant, this
sixth comparison, which clearly favors wild species
and/or individuals over domesticated breeds and/or
individuals, would outweigh it.

however, Duran alludes to the fact that "hwnan-created
breeds... have contributed the most to the course of
human history and culture." Since no Shire horse alive
today has contributed to hwnan history, this seems pretty
clearly to be a reference to domesticated breeds rather
than individuals. So perhaps Duran's fIfth comparison
is best construed as a comparison between domesticated
individuals and/or breeds to wild individuals and/or
species. As such, it represents the only reason Duran
offers for thinking that domesticated breeds (as
opposed to individuals) "compare favorably" with wild
species (as opposed to individuals).
But Duran is herself skeptical of the moral relevance
of this comparison. She writes: "The fact that a
breed... contributed greatly to the development of
human culture, does not immediately seem to be a
morally relevant difference," Moreover, it is unclear
how much weight she would be willing to place on it
even if it were admitted as relevant. She begins the
paragraph in question by writing:

ill: Evaluating Duran's Conclusion
Duran offers no other comparisons for consideration.
In light of what I have said, then, what Duran has done
in her paper comes to the following:
Concerning question Ql> she has offered three
reasons for thinking that individual domesticated
animals are more morally significant than individual
wild animals. Specifically, she has argued that
A) they often are more acutely sensitive to pain
and/or to emotional distress (comparison #2),
B) they often are "exceptional" or "gifted"
members of their species (comparison #4), and
C) they often are valued by human beings for
historical and cultural reasons (comparison #5).
Although she appears to admit that (C), if morally
relevant, is outweighed by the fact that individual
members of wild species are "members of the original
primeval environment," reasons (A) and (B) do, if
accepted, support her contention that, on the whole,
domesticated individuals are more morally significant
than wild individuals. This is how Duran's argument
supports answer Al to question QI.
Concerning question Q2, Duran has offered only one
comparison in support of answer A2 , namely that
domesticated breeds are more morally significant than
wild species insofar as the former are of greater
historical and cultural value than the latter. However,
as I indicated earlier, Duran is herself skeptical of the
relevance of this comparison, and she appears to think
that it is outweighed by the fact that wild species are
"members of the original primeval environment" So,
rather than supporting answer A 2 to question Q2,
Duran's analysis actually supports answer A 2 1:
A21) Wild species or subspecies have greater
moral significance than domesticated
species or breeds.
Duran's concluding paragraph is, therefore,
misleadingly written. She writes:

One might be inclined to note that the traits
which these animals have are, ofcourse, traits
specifically desired by humans, but...one
could move with that assertion in either
direction.
Here Duran seems uncertain whether or not to be
embarrassed by appearing to base concern for
domesticated animals on anthropocentric reasoning, for
the passage continues:
Surely the fact that a German short-haired
pointer puppy may begin spontaneously to
point at an early age does not count against
the value of pointers as such, since pointing is
merely an exaggeration of traits which most
dogs possess.
This reference to "the value of pointers as such"
suggests that Duran wants, if at all possible, to find
inherent value in domesticated animals, rather than
relying on their instrumental value to humans. The
next sentence of the paragraph similarly suggests that
she would be unwilling to place much weight on her
fifth comparison even if it were admitted as morally
relevant
Sixth comparison. Here, Duran strikes off in an
altogether different direction with a remark that
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In sum, I have argued that if we can accept
a view of animal rights for non-domesticated
species, there are probably no strong reasons
for denying the rights to domesticated species,
both when seen from the standpoint of the
individual creatures involved, and when seen
from the (more interesting. I believe) stand
point of breeds vs. species.

wild, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for saying that it is
domesticated. Probably the fact that a population would either
perish or \Dldergo radical change if human interaction with it
were withdrawn is sufficient for saying that it is no longer
wild. A species like the California condor is no longer wild,
precisely because this is true of it. However, the California
condor is not therefore domesticated. So the fact that a
population would either perish or undergo radical change if
human interaction with it were withdrawn is not sufficient
for saying that it is domesticated. Neither is it necessary,
however. For surely there are or have been some domesticated
breeds (e.g., prospectors' burros) which would neither perish
nor change radically upon reverting to a feral condition.

Duran fails clearly to distinguish question QI from
question Q2. and she therefore speaks as if. in arguing
for a particular answer to the fIrSt question. she has
simultaneously argued for an analogous answer to
the second.

4 In my "Biological FWlctions and Biological Interests"
(forthcoming) I argue that every individual organism has
interests in the fulfillment of the biological functions of its
various component organs and subsystems, where biological
functions are dermed in terms of consequence selection of
organs and subsystems in the individual's ancestors. My
argument explains the relevance of an individual organism's
being the product of evolution, without suggesting that
evolving species have interests. The locus of what I call
"biological interests" is the former, not the latter)

Notes
1 Hereafter I speak simply of wild "species" instead of
"species or subspecies," and of domesticated "breeds" rather
than "species or breeds." Also, in what follows I speak
consistently of the relative "moral significance" of various
entities. Duran speaks interchangeably of "moral
significance" and "moral rights," but the two concepts are
distinct from each other. and each is in tum distinct from the
concept of bare moral considerability. On this point, .see
Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable,"
JollT1llJ1oj"Philosophy75 (1978),pp. 311-12. To Goodpaster's
analysis I would add only that, assuming that moral rights
function to protect interests, having interests is a necessary
condition for having rights, but not necessarily for being
morally considerable. It may be that an object's being
beautiful suffices to make it morally considerable. This,
apparently, was G. E. Moore's view in Principia Ethica. For
an application to endangered species (both wild and
domesticated) see Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species
Matter?" Environmental Ethics 3 (1981), pp. 101-12. Notice,
however that Russow's argument does not show that
endangered species and breeds themselves have aesthetic
value, since, as she is careful to note, only the individual
members of an endangered breed or species instantiate beauty.

2 Here "individualistic" means "attributing direct moral
significance only to individual organisms." This is the usual
sense of the terin in the literature of environmental ethics.
Individualism in this sense is consistent with, but not
equivalent to, the individualism which lames Rachels
advocates, and which Duran explicitly discusses in her paper.
3 Duran appears to think that this difference marks the
core of the conceptual distinction between a domesticated
breed and a wild subspecies. However, "domesticated" means
,more than "no longer wild," and while the condition Duran
Idtes probably is sufficient for saying that a species is no longer
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